The Italian Folgore Parachute Division - Paolo Morisi

This review has been submitted to Military History Online.

Title: The Italian Folgore Parachute Division

Author: Paolo Morisi

ISBN: 978-1-911-09624-5

Publisher: Helion and Company

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 206

Photos/Maps: 84/9

Rightly or wrongly the Italian land forces of the Second World War are viewed as the poor cousins of the Axis alliance. A notable exception to this is the elite Folgore (Lightning) Parachute Division. Similar in nature to parachute elements in most armies, it was made up of the better officers and men of the Italian Army and was trained to a higher degree of skill and effectiveness. This book is a historical narrative of the development, operations and ultimate destruction of this unit.

Like many of its contemporaries, the Folgore was designed and equipped to be a light infantry element, thus it lacked prime movers, heavy weapons and other accoutrements that would impede its mobility. Initially developed with a view towards the invasion of Malta, when that was cancelled, it was rerolled into an infantry role in the African campaign. Unfortunately, it was not properly equipped for this new task and was ultimately trapped and, for the most part, destroyed during the Battle of El Alamien. The remnants continued to fight as the Axis retreated across the desert and was caught up in the final surrender of the Afrika Korps in Tunisia.

Morisi has presented a comprehensive analysis of the creation, recruitment, training and operational history of this Division. Its relatively short lifespan precluded it from earning the accolades that it perhaps deserved and this book is a focussed effort to redress that. The narrative is based upon extensive primary source material as well as interviews with surviving members of the Division and those that operated alongside and against it. Morisi has structured his work in a logical and engaging way placing particular emphasis upon the numerous operations that the Division was involved in. This is a very balanced rendition of the Units history as its strengths and weaknesses are discussed with equal candor. 

The quality of the publication is outstanding; typical of the Helion publishing house. The extensive maps and photographs also lend a visual appreciation to the narrative. I found this work to be very informative and thought provoking. Morisi has done an excellent job with his operational analysis and discussion of the larger strategic issues that affected the Divisions development and use. For those interested in a greater appreciation of one of the more effective Italian contributions to the Second World War, this book is recommended.

Strategy: Context and Adaption from Archidamus to Airpower - Richard J Bailey, James Forsyth, Mark Yeisley

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine

Title: Strategy: Context and Adaption from Archidamus to Airpower

Editor: Richard J Bailey, James Forsyth, Mark Yeisley

ISBN: 978-1-682-47003-9

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 279

Strategy is a dynamic, living thing; intimately influenced by technology, geography, society and science. The editors have collaborated in bringing together a series of essays, each dealing with different aspects of strategy and its application and influence on the modern battlefield. The authors of the essays are academics, experts in their fields and all PhD instructors associated with the US School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. The intent of this work is to both promote and facilitate change in the way that strategy is perceived and applied.

The chapters of the book represent facets of strategy and strategic thought that are not necessarily appreciated by those inculcated into the more traditional strategic trifecta: politics, plans and execution within a military context. The broadening of the strategic scope enables the planner to better appreciate the environment within which they are obligated to work and execute their task. This holistic approach recognizes the need to approach strategy in a dynamic and non-linear fashion backstopped against a comprehensive education of strategic thought.

Concurrent to the task of strategic expansion is the need to blend this thought practice with the application of airpower theory; or how to undertake achieving the strategic goal within the boundaries and limitations of modern airpower principles. This is a challenging task, readily acknowledged by the authors, but one that is of critical importance if one is to be effective. Nevertheless, the work underscores the need to think of strategic aims and goals beyond the simple application of force; and to do so in a concurrent fashion. This further assists in meeting the constraints of the applied force of airpower.

In addition to its variety of thought-provoking essays, this work contains an extensive array of foot and endnotes that further clarify the discussion points of the authors. This proved very helpful as, with any essay, there are aspects that require expansion in order to facilitate understanding. The book is rounded out with a comprehensive bibliography of supplemental and relevant readings. The academic intent of this work, which is to help identify for the reader/student, what strategy is in its most basic form. However, the authors readily acknowledge that this question is an elusive target and that the book really aims at providing guidance on numerous methods by which strategy may be sought. In this respect the book is very successful.

The authors have created a work that covers a broad range of strategic analysis and method. In the case of this book, the emphasis focuses upon the use of strategy in relation to the effective application of airpower; however, it should be noted that the methods discussed in this work have a relevance far outside of the military application of strategy. The process of understanding the underlying methods of deriving strategy and its application is as important as the determination of strategic executions. This work helps guide the reader in this direction. 

Miracle at the Litza: Hitler’s First Defeat on the Eastern Front - Alf R Jacobsen

This review has been submitted to the Australian Naval Institute Journal

Title: Miracle at the Litza: Hitler’s First Defeat on the Eastern Front

Author: Alf R Jacobsen

ISBN: 978-1-612-00506-5

Publisher: Casemate

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 190

Photos/Maps: 71/8

Histories of the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia, traditionally focus upon the line of activities running from the Baltic to Romania and the incredible successes that the Germans enjoyed during the first six months of that campaign. Lesser known but of longer term significance was the savage and austere fighting that occurred in the high arctic on the approaches to Murmansk. Jacobsen has drawn upon primary source material from the archives of Russia, Germany, England, Norway and Finland in an effort to address this shortcoming.

The book outlines the planning and execution of the German attacks across two lines of advance, the challenges faced and why they ultimately failed. He also provides a detailed account of the Russian and English efforts at countering these attacks. Ultimately these efforts, unlike the rest of the Eastern Front, were successful and served as an excellent example of joint operational planning and execution across both service elements and between the British and Russians.

Jacobsen does a noteworthy job of analyzing why the German/Finnish forces failed and it centers upon a few key lessons:

1.    A failure of German Intelligence to accurately determine the forces both physical as well as climatic facing them across the northern approaches to Murmansk;

2.    Failure to engage with the Finns early enough to have them provide meaningful input into the planning process;

3.    Failure of relations between German strategic, operational and tactical levels of Command and a resultant loss of trust and focus;

4.    German failure to maintain the schwerepunkt of attack and the subsequent reinforcement of failure as opposed to success between the Northern and Salla approaches to Murmansk; and

5.    A dilution of limited forces across the North.

Conversely, the author’s discussion of the Allied efforts also highlights certain lessons:

1.    The critical importance of effective joint operations (in this case naval and naval air) on both morale and flexibility;

2.    Effective intelligence; both the timely interception and effective use of;

3.    Allied engagement and the challenge of the perception of help versus tangible assistance on trust and cooperation;

4.    Ensuring that the correct assets are available to provide flexible response options to local commanders (in this case naval gunfire, submarine and naval air options); and

5.    The under-rated but critical importance of dogged resilience in effective defensive operations.

Jacobsen’s analysis and presentation of this previously underrepresented aspect of Operation Barbarossa is a nuanced, balanced and thoroughly readable work. The maps provided are somewhat busy and hard to follow but provide an adequate appreciation of elevations and the challenging nature of the environment. The book closes with a synopsis/analysis of the campaign by a former head of the Norwegian Armed Forces who lends a professional soldiers perspective from one who intimately knows the ground being fought over. Highly recommended.

Otto Skorzeny: The Devil’s Disciple - Stuart Smith

This review submitted to Soldier Magazine.

Title: Otto Skorzeny: The Devil’s Disciple

Author: Stuart Smith

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 384

Maps:  5

Photos: 44

Otto Skorzeny has been not been remembered kindly by historians. A hard line Nazi and self-promoter, he has been accused of taking the credit duly owed to others. Smith has produced a work that balances that assumption. Eminently readable and well researched, his book presents Skorzeny as both a courageous and dedicated soldier of Hitler as well as a vain and venal man; both facets are correct. The  Operations that he led are presented and analyzed in order to shed light on his strengths and weaknesses as a commander. Smith also provides a detailed background of Skorzeny before and after the war, providing the context needed to understand the man himself and his drives. Well worth a look.

Morning Star, Midnight Sun - Jeffrey R Cox

This review submitted to Sabretache Magazine.

Title: Morning Star, Midnight Sun

Author: Jeffrey R Cox

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2638-1

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Softcover

Pages: 448

Maps:  4

There remains a common misperception that, following their defeat at Midway, that the tide of war had turned definitively against the Japanese and that their ultimate defeat was now inevitable. Jeffrey Cox’s work proves this to be categorically false. That they had suffered a major setback was indeed the case and recognized but the Japanese still viewed the war as winnable.

This was a particularly enjoyable book to read; not only for its detailed content and analysis, but also for the humour and style of the author. Interspersed with his discussion of the events of the period covered by the book, are ‘sidebar’ interpretations of reactions of commanders and participants. These cynical interjections add levity and, indeed, a more human element to the narrative. The traditional stoic demeanour of the Japanese are given a more realistic feel. The Allies, a more truthful reflection of the strains of multinational as well as inter-service operations. 

Cox balances his narrative extremely well between the protagonists. The reader is provided with fascinating insights into the effects of fog of war, opinions and expectations of individual Commanders and a deep understanding of the pressures of command and the cumulative effects of decisions. During this period, both the Allies and the Japanese commanders were under great pressure to achieve clear victories. While the Americans had defeated the Japanese at Midway, they had lost a carrier in the process resulting in an operational draw. The American public demanded greater success. Conversely, the Japanese commanders felt compelled to avenge the stain of their Midway losses. Compounding this pressure was the fact that neither side, at this time, had the depth of resources to compensate for any additional losses of capital ships.

The author effectively captures the complex interplay between the adversaries as they struggled to control the seas and skies over the centre of gravity during this period: Guadacanal Island. The Japanese proved conclusively that they remained more than a match for the American forces facing them. In fact, they held a majority of the cards in terms of surface vessels, command quality, operational options and control of the seas. Having trained exhaustively for night operations, the Japanese continued to rule the night with the Americans maintaining an advantage during the daylight. Two things had changed however that are not widely appreciated but are glaringly obvious in Cox’s analysis: the Americans had finally found an Admiral in Halsey that had the aggressiveness and presence to take the fight to the Japanese and the vaunted “Sea Eagles”, the Japanese carrier aviators that had ruled the skies up to now, had been decimated and were a fraction of their former numbers. The replacement pool was unable to replace the losses with similar quality aviators.

Cox has drafted an outstanding book of exceptional quality and content. His narrative style is engaging and keeps the reader hooked. His comprehensive knowledge of this period is reflected in his deep analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the American and Japanese forces. Regardless of whether one is interested in naval operations in the Pacific Theatre, this book remains not only and excellent reference but also read.

On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle - B.A. Friedman

This review has been submitted to Strategy and Tactics Magazine.

Title: On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle

Author: B.A. Friedman

ISBN: 978-1-682471-63-0

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 241

The authors starts this work with the premise that Tactics, as a concept of war fighting, requires a reanalysis in light of the changes that have occurred in both the nature and execution of warfare. The re-examination focuses upon the elevation of tactics to a level that supplants the ‘operational’ level of command and a discussion on the traditional principles of warfare and their application to the modern battlefield.  

The book is not an easy read and requires patience to really glean what the author is looking to achieve. That is not to say that it is not well written but doctrine in and of itself requires thought and focus. In that light, this book demands considered deliberation.

He starts from the Clauswitzian school of the principles of war and decries the standard scholastic approach of rote learning and application. He emphasizes the need to avoid the trap of doctrine and its principles becoming dogma. Notwithstanding this position, Friedman does suggest an abridged, updated version that he identifies as being Tenets of War vice Principles. He postulates the difference as being one where Principles are rigid whereas Tenets are not. It is somewhat challenging to see where the line between the two is drawn but certainly, his suggestion is a good place for discussion and engagement. He divides his Tenets into three distinct categories: Physical, Mental and Moral. Follow-on chapters address each in more detail.

A central aspect of his analysis is his rejection of the Operational level of war. His position is that anything involving operations below the level of strategy is in fact tactics. To define an intermediary level is to inject un-necessary friction and confusion in the application of the Tenets. He does however, readily acknowledge the utility of an operational designation for those aspects that do not have a clear ‘home’ within the tactical or strategic levels (logistics, cyber, asymmetric, etc).

His assertion that those areas outside of the strategic/tactical sphere are in fact elements of operational art but not strategy or tactics in and of themselves is somewhat confusing. After all, in the modern age, cyber warfare for example, has become a means of engaging ones adversaries without any physical interaction and could therefore be defined as a method of achieving strategic aims.

The main body of the book is followed by a series of appendices that expand upon his positions vis-à-vis asymmetric warfare, the operational level of war, centre of gravity, training and structure. These are very helpful in clarifying how these various elements are incorporated (or not) into his assertion that Strategy and Tactics are the only two viable levels of war.

Overall, this work is an interesting salvo into an area that does deserve review. His position is certainly understandable; however, rejection of an operational level of command does run the risk of muddying the delineation of responsibility between commanders. Changes in capability, technology and methodology certainly underscore the need to look at how militaries control and command in war. This work suggests some interesting proposals.

From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944 - C J Dick

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: From Victory to Stalemate: The Western Front, Summer 1944

Author: C J Dick

ISBN: 978-0-7006-2293-1

Publisher: Kansas UP

Year: 2016

Hardcover

Pages: 465

Maps: 14

Photos: 0

In this, the first of a two volume set, the author has undertaken to ascertain the causes behind the Western Allied forces failure in their efforts to knock Germany out of the war in 1944. Certainly, there was every reason for confidence that this was attainable once Allies had overcome the German defences at Normandy and broken out into the French interior. The re-establishment of maneuver warfare against a greatly degraded German military should have sounded the death knell for Axis defensive efforts in the West.

While the author does discuss in detail the elements of the Western Campaign, starting with the invasion of Normandy, he is clear that the focus of the book is not another rendition of that series of battles. Rather, he uses the campaign as a means of facilitating his analysis of where, how and why the Allies diverged from a focussed drive at the destruction the Wehrmacht and its combat capability into a series of costly (in terms of time, effort and logistics) secondary and tertiary efforts that ultimately diluted their operational effectiveness. Thereby enabling the Germans to retain a defensive capability and thus prolong the war.

Dick looks at the foundations of the operational level of war and how these building blocks were applied in the development of and the execution of doctrine in the different Allied nations (in this case American, British and Canadian). Given the lack of experience amongst senior Allied commanders under combat conditions, he further discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each of the army’s as they undertook the buildup and follow-on operations in Normandy and beyond. He follows this with a detailed discussion and analysis of national logistics capabilities and their performance under operational conditions. His book winds up with a comprehensive review of each of the senior (Army and Army Group) commanders performance through the lens of the relative doctrine each was operating under.

This is a particularly strong book in that explains in clear, concise terms the reasons behind the Allies failure to effectively overcome a drastically weakening Wehrmacht for 11 months, despite their unchallenged command of the air and logistic dominance. His balanced examination is uncompromising in its conclusions. It provides the reader with an outstanding assessment of the influences that coloured the Allies decision making. Focussing on elements such as divergent doctrine, media critique, political interference, hubris (an assumption that the collapse of German resistance was imminent), an application of doctrine as dogma vice guidance, failure of effective command, inter-service rivalry and a failure to oversee and plan for the efficient execution of logistics support, Dick’s work underscores challenges that transcend World War 2 and are as applicable today as they were in 1944. Very strongly recommended for the senior commander regardless of element.

Breakout At Stalingrad - Heinrich Gerlach

This review has been submitted to British Army Review.

Title: Breakout At Stalingrad

Author: Heinrich Gerlach

ISBN: 978-1-7866-9062-3

Publisher: Apollo

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 707

The story behind the writing and publication of this novel is in fact a story unto itself. The author, Heinrich Gerlach, was a German soldier captured after the surrender of Stalingrad in February, 1943. He remained in Soviet captivity until 1950. During that time he gathered the stories of a number of fellow Stalingrad survivors including some of the most senior ranking officers. He then drafted his 600 page manuscript in secret between 1943-1945 while in captivity. The novel is not an autobiography but he is represented in the book as Lt Breuer, an Intelligence Officer with an armoured unit.

Gerlach wrote this book as a testament to the German Landser (soldier) and their experiences in the Stalingrad pocket. It is an intimate and raw narrative. Every aspect of their lives and trials is articulated through the books characters. This is not about strategy, tactics or the good or bad elements of the war; it is a story about men trapped in a tightening noose and their reactions to that environment. He is able to accurately relate, to those who may only appreciate the reflection of the horrors of Stalingrad, the agony of the 6^th Army as it gradually but inexorably deteriorated from a professional fighting force into a starving mob, scrabbling for survival. Gerlach is able to relate the best and worst of the human condition, stressed beyond imagination.

The author drafted his manuscript as a means of dealing with the nightmare that he and hundreds of thousands of his comrades had endured; that he was able to undertake this task so soon after the event further enhances the poignancy of the account. While the characters may be amalgamations of numerous people, the environment is accurate and horrific.

The story itself follows a section of soldiers, each with their own perspective on the war and the Nazi regime. Each character is well developed within the context of the Stalingrad environs and the struggle each has internally and externally; as the battle unfolds and becomes more desperate, this struggle is both realistic and thought provoking. The reader can easily find themselves psychologically embedded with the characters in the book.

This was fascinating book to read, coming from an author who personally experienced the narrative he created. It flows well and it is easy to lose track of time as one becomes drawn into the story. The addition of the addendum explaining the background of the novel and its transition from Soviet hands back into German in 2011 is very unique. This is a strong story with an affecting narrative that reminds one of Guy Sajer’s: The Forgotten Soldier. It is well worth an in-depth read.

The Causes of War and the Spread of Peace - Azar Gat

This review has been submitted to Soldier Magazine.

Title: The Causes of War and the Spread of Peace

Author: Azar Gat

ISBN: 978-0-19-879502-5

Publisher: Oxford UP

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 303

The author has undertaken an analysis of war as a fundamental aspect of man’s psychological development. He suggests that conflict is in fact a manifestation of societies need for: culling of the weak, power, resources and space. The first world has developed to the point where these needs have been met without the need to resort to physical violence; diminishing the requirement for war. Non-first world countries do not have this level of development and are still subject to the more basic needs. Globalization means that the challenges of these countries cannot be contained within their boundaries. A thoughtful and well balanced analysis of modern international challenges.

East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 - Roy E Appleman

Title: East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950

Author: Roy E Appleman

ISBN: 978-0890962831

Publisher: Texas A & M UP

Year: 1987

Hardcover

Pages: 361

Maps:  11

Photos: 41

The advance of UN forces into North Korea and the region of the Yalu River following the landing at Inchon in 1950 is well known and studied. The subsequent surprise attack by overwhelming Chinese infantry forces and the collapse of the UN drive followed by the desperate fighting retreat of the Marines of X Corps from around the Chosin Reservoir stands as one of the defining moments of the Korean Conflict. Lesser known but no less dramatic was the tragedy of the Army’s 31 Regimental Combat Team (RCT), destroyed while attempting to retreat after defending the 7^th Marines Eastern flank.

The author has drawn upon the first hand recollections of survivors as well as declassified documents from the Army and Marines to paint a comprehensive picture of a unit that circumstance, hubris and poor planning had destined for disaster. Additionally, he also relates a story of individual courage, tenacity and will on the part of individual soldiers and officers. Make no mistake however, Appleman pulls no punches in his rendition of selfishness and appalling leadership collapse.

It is a maxim that one’s true nature is revealed during times of intense stress and hardship; the experience of 31 RCT highlights this fact in glaring detail. If nothing else, this tragedy serves as a teaching tool on leadership under adverse conditions. The collapse of the command structure and the subsequent deterioration of the 31 RCT from a military unit into a mob of individuals within a matter of hours is a harsh testament to the necessity of maintenance of unit cohesion and discipline and the critical roles of the NCO’s and Officers to that effect

There are many lessons to be gleaned from this work:

1.    The critical necessity of maintaining communications;

2.    The role of the Commander and where they need to be in order to ensure accessibility and the maintenance of operational control;

3.    Clear planning and ensuring that sub-units understand their roles and responsibilities;

4.    Anticipation of requirements. Commanders must not micromanage but focus on what is required next;

5.    Logistics: the need to identify critical requirements and the absolute necessity for the Command to deliver based upon those requirements

6.    The critical role of junior Officers and NCO’s in maintaining unit cohesion and discipline; and

7.    The need for inter-service cooperation and a common operating environment.

The experience of the 31^st RCT in Chosin should be studied by leadership academies and used a teaching tool for how not to undertake an operation. Individuals involved within the 7^th Marines and the RCT certainly rose to the challenge of the occasion and serve as examples for others to emulate; however, overall, the lessons of this tragedy are more akin to what not to do rather than the opposite.

Whispers Across The Atlantick - David Smith

This review has been submitted to the Canadian Army Journal. 

Title: Whispers Across The Atlantick

Author: David Smith

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2795-1

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 292

Maps:  5

Photos: 15

General William Howe was appointed the Commander of the Crown forces deployed to crush the rebellion that had broken out in the United States in 1776. The British Navy had unchallenged control of the seas and its land forces a heavy professional advantage over the American rebels. Things unfortunately did not go nearly as planned for the British; hampered by hubris, personal animosity between the commanders of the different British and German (the British Crown had hired German mercenaries) units, a failure to prioritize and focus on the primary task of destroying the rebel army and a marked failure to undertake operations with drive and urgency resulted in a growing dissatisfaction and a loss of confidence with Howe by the British Government. His resignation after the 1777 campaign season and the subsequent public enquiry in the House of Commons form the basis of the book.

I particularly enjoyed Smith’s approach to his narrative. Each chapter commences with the pertinent element of Howe’s speech to the House followed by an evaluation of the contents by the author (taking advantage of the benefit of hindsight). The chapter that follows expands upon the actions of the various antagonists during the period covered. This approach makes for a much clearer understanding of what the perceptions of Howe were at the time as compared to the reality of his actions on the ground.

The degree to which commanders relied upon the initiative of their subordinates during this period is clear. Limitations in communications and the challenges of operating along very limited axis’s of advance (in many cases consisting of rivers or game tracks) resulted in decisions being made based upon information that had been overtaken by events. More to the point though an explanation of the failure of the British to attain victory during these critical early years, lies in the authors analysis of Howe as a commander and his failure to grasp the operational and strategic options that would have destroyed the capacity of the Americans to continue the war. It is clear that Howe was not an incompetent General but that he was a man out of his depth in the combined symmetric and asymmetric styles of warfare that constituted the Revolution.

Additionally, Howe’s efforts were impeded by the inflexible position assumed by the British government in relation to the demands of the American colonists. His orders to destroy the various colony’s infrastructure as a means of undermining the will of the revolutionaries combined with a refusal to even acknowledge their grievances, ensured a steady and growing level of support for the insurrection. Smith discusses this challenge in some detail.   

Osprey has published a very good quality book. The main drawback to the content of the book itself is the quality of the maps. They are reproductions of the original maps produced at the time for the consumption of the British public and are, unfortunately, difficult to read and follow. Otherwise the narrative is excellent, the bibliography extensive and the font large enough to read easily. I very much enjoyed this book as it shed light upon the nature of 18^th century command as well as the challenge of conducting a war from a distance. Recommended.

A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945 - Col T.N. Dupuy

Title: A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945

Author: Col T.N. Dupuy

ISBN: 0-13-351114-6

Publisher: Prentice Hall

Year: 1977

Hardcover

Pages: 363

Maps:  19

Photos: 74

 Students of modern military history will agree that one of the most influential elements of the modern command system in most if not all countries has been the legacy of the German General Staff System, developed under the auspices of The Reformers (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz, Grolman and Boyen) following the collapse of the Prussian military at the Battles of Jena and Auerstadt in 1807. Dupuy’s work traces the development, institutionalization and influence of this system on the German military and, by extension, State up to the end of 1945.

This is a brilliant analysis of the staff system. Revolutionary in scope and visionary in implementation; it served to transform the Prussian and German States from a third rate power to the standard by which other militaries were measured. While the narrative is clear and logical, there are three elements which stand out as being key to the success and ultimate failure of the German military.

The first two and the foundation of the system (and that which gave it such resiliency and capacity) was the Founders success at “Institutionalizing Military Excellence”. This entailed ensuring the development and maintenance of a military as free as possible from the ‘vagaries of change’ resultant from human fallibility. In effect ensuring military excellence regardless of the influence of changing leadership. Dupuy provides an insightful and concise discourse on how the Germans developed a process of ensuring an Army of consistent and reliable ‘Organizational Genius’ while concurrently providing the structure within which leaders of ‘Operational Genius’ were developed. Additionally, the military leadership was to remain aloof and disconnected to the political machinations of the State.

The third aspect that they endeavoured to implement, but were ultimately unsuccessful, was ensuring that the military and its leadership were seen and understood to be tools of and accountable to the people of Prussia and ultimately, Germany. Where this failed was in the relationship between the Kaiser and the Reichstag (or Parliament). The Kaiser insisted upon an Army that was loyal to and controlled by Him. Thus it was that the leadership and the Army swore fealty to the Kaiser and not to Germany (as represented by the people).

The book goes a long way towards providing an explanation as to why the German Army remained an effective, focussed fighting force right up until the last days of the Second World War. It also, by extension, explains why the military did not intervene with the rise of Hitler and also swore an oath to him. Dupuy’s analysis shows the strength of the system that the Germans had created and how it translated into such an effective military force. Additionally, the dangers of providing such an effective tool to an individual as opposed to an accountable entity is also made abundantly clear.

This is a great book, logically laid out and comprehensive in its scope. It serves as an outstanding review of the strengths and weaknesses of the German Staff system.

1918: Winning the War, Losing the War - Matthias Strohn

This review has been submitted to the British Army Review.

Title: 1918: Winning the War, Losing the War

Author: Matthias Strohn

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2933-7

Publisher: Osprey

Year: 2018

Hardcover

Pages: 304

Maps:  8

Photos: 19

Those who have studied the First World War in any way will agree that the key front between victory or defeat was the Western Front. They will also agree that for the duration of the war, the Western Front, unlike the East and Southern Fronts, was static except for two brief periods: 1914 leading up to the Battle of the Marne and 1918 with the final offensives of the Germans and the subsequent Last 100 Days of the Allies. 1918, as its title implies, focuses upon the final year of the war, but not as an analysis of the movements and activities of the different protagonists; but as a discussion of the relative capabilities, the strengths, weaknesses and the influencing factors that reflected the different armies as they faced each other after 4 years of warfare.

This book draws upon the knowledge of a number of respected military historians, each well published and hailing from a variety of teaching institutions in Austria, Germany, the UK, the United States and Ireland. Each of the 10 contributors has been given a nation or subject to discuss (ie the Air Campaign, Naval Warfare, the British Army, the German Army etc) covering off all of the major facets of the war as it was in 1918. Each is a stand-alone analysis and may be read independent of the others. Austro-Hungary, Russia, the Ottomans and Italy are not covered as chapters but are lumped together in the sections: The Forgotten Fronts of Europe and the War Outside of Europe. This is unfortunate as certainly the three nations of Italy, Austro-Hungary and Turkey were still very active participants in their own right.

The chapters are drafted in a format similar in nature to a university lecture; not surprising given the backgrounds of the contributors. This also ensures that the content flows logically, is lucid and engaging. This improves both the quality of the reading experience as well as facilitating the knowledge that wishes to be passed.

The narrative of the book is bookended by an initial introductory chapter that places the impact of the final year of the War into a modern day context as well as a final installment that captures a number of the lessons to be gleaned from the results of the year’s events on the Western Front. On the German side, the campaigns of 1918 revealed a completely revamped operational and tactical engagement methodology based upon the ‘Stormtrooper’ infiltration tactics and vastly improved artillery utilization. It proved to be extremely effective at breaking the deadlock of trench warfare but could not be sustained due primarily to logistical limitations. On the Allied side, it was the lesson of interdependence between Allies. Up to that point in the war, nations had worked together but retained their operational independence. The crisis of the German offensives set the conditions on the Allied side for the appointment of a senior commander for all Allied armies, something that was never achieved amongst the Central Powers; this in turn significantly improved the Entente’s operational effectiveness and focus.

Overall, 1918 is an excellent analysis of the final year of the war, drawing upon the expertise of a number of different subject matter experts. The analysis is clear, concise and in-depth; it is unfortunate that Austro-Hungary and Turkey do not have their own chapters but they are not ignored. The conclusion is comprehensive and draws attention to a series of lessons that still resonate a century later. It is clear, from the discussion, that the war was still very much undecided as the protagonists entered the summer of 1918 and could easily have had very different results given just a few changes. A book well worth reading and discussing.

Case Red: The Collapse of France - Robert Forczyk

This review has been submitted to the British Military History Journal. 

Title: Case Red: The Collapse of France

Author: Robert Forczyk

ISBN: 978-1-4728-2442-4

Publisher: Osprey Publishing

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 464

Photos/Maps: 60/7

Studies relating to the Battle for France in 1940 tend to focus upon the initial weeks of the conflict running from the invasion of the Low Countries (Fall Gelb) and culminating in the evacuation of Allied troops at Dunkirk. Relatively little has been drafted relating to the follow-on Fall Rot (Case Red) which encompassed the drive south following Dunkirk and the capture of the remaining French territory. Forczyk’s book undertakes to address this shortfall and to draw attention to the Allied efforts, political and military, to contain the German drive. Included in his analysis are a series of studies highlighting challenges and successes by both sides and their background causes.

The author commences his work with a broad study of the Allied efforts in the years leading up to the invasion (1919-1939). This is critical for the reader to better appreciate the lack of coordination and internal dissention between the Western Countries. This was especially true of Belgium whose foreign policies served to both weaken and undermine French plans for countering the Germans.

His discussions draw attention to a number of areas that have generally not been addressed in past books on the battle of France. Following the evacuation at Dunkirk, there was an operational pause on the part of the Germans as they reformed their units and undertook the planning for the second phase of the attack on France: Fall Rot. Much of the planning and preparation has been glossed over in the major histories of this conflict. Hitler had given the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – German High Command) only ten days between the end of Fall Gelb and the beginning of Fall Rot (25 May to 5 June). During that time in addition to planning the next stages of the advance, they also had to coordiante and deliver over 50,000 tons of supplies from Germany to their forward units (200 miles over destroyed and damaged transportation infrastructure). Support on this scale had  never been attempted before; Forczyk discusses in detail the logistical efforts of this period and the challenges overcome.

Additionally, it is important to note that the French remained a potent adversary even after their initial setbacks; one that the Germans viewed very seriously. The author looks at the methodology that the Germans undertook in order to retain their advantage after the element of surprise had been lost through superior planning and execution as well as joint operations between air and ground forces.

Forcyzk is balanced in his appraisals of the adversary’s capabilities but he is particularly scathing in this analysis of the French and British High Commands. He specifically focusses upon their divergence from both political oversight and control as well as the abrogation of their responsibility towards the soldiers under their command. This appears particularly true in the case of Weygand, the French Commander as he repeatedly dismissed direction from the French Government.    

Included in this work are a number of minor incidents that have been lost or overlooked. For example the French air force undertook 11 air raids on German cities during the Battle of France including the first air raid on Berlin when a single Farman bomber flew a round trip mission of over 3000 km, dropping 3 tonnes of bombs before returning back to base. The inclusion of these types of stories add both depth and breadth to Forcyzk’s narrative.

Osprey has published an excellent book that is well worth adding to one’s library. The author has drafted a book that adds much to the limited amount available on the German operations following Dunkirk. He sheds additional light on the deep challenges that the Western Allies faced in the early years of the war while also drawing attention to German areas of weakness. A very worthwhile read.

Blood in the Forest: The End of the Second World War in the Courland Pocket - Vincent Hunt

This review has been submitted to Canadian Army Today Magazine.

Title: Blood in the Forest: The End of the Second World War in the Courland Pocket

Author: Vincent Hunt

ISBN: 978-1-91151-206-6

Publisher: Helion Publishing

Year: 2017

Hardcover

Pages: 268

Photos/Maps: 38/6

While the world’s attention was focussed upon the dramatic race between the US and British forces in the West and the Soviet forces in the East racing towards Berlin, a cataclysmic struggle was unfolding on a small (relatively) expanse of land jutting out into the Baltic Sea from Latvia: the Courland Pocket. Germany had to hold onto the ports and facilities in this region to continue to give it an area within which to develop and build its new u-boat fleet (free from the strategic bombers of the West) and to deny the Soviets unfettered access to the Baltic Sea. The Soviets, for their part, viewed this region as not only part of their empire occupied by the Germans but as a breakaway region (Latvia) that needed to be reconquered and occupied.

Over a half-million soldiers were involved in the fighting on both sides. Interestingly, the Germans were able to maintain their logistical support lines due to the port facilities at Liepaja and Ventspils. As a result, and also due to the constricted lines of approach open to the Soviets, the Germans and their Allies were able to hold off the Soviets despite six distinct Army level battles between October, 1944 and May, 1945. Over that period the Germans were pushed back but retained over two-thirds of the territory originally held at the commencement of the fighting.

Unique to this campaign was the distribution of Latvian nationals fighting for both protagonists (Soviet and German). The reasons for doing so were varied and in many cases did not involve a choice; nevertheless, families were often divided and members found themselves fighting each other on opposite sides. Adding additional complexity to the region was the asymmetric fighting going on behind both the German and Soviet lines involving a myriad of groups oftentimes fighting each other as well as the ‘occupiers’.

The author has adopted a distinctive approach to his writing that initially is somewhat distracting until the reader adapts to it. As opposed to drafting an exclusively historical narrative to describe the events of the period, he has interwoven a discussion of his modern day travels throughout the region, his meetings with survivors and a rendition of the period events of the battles. He also discusses issues not directly related to the base line narrative such as the experiences of Vaira Vike-Freiberga the former President of Latvia who was a young girl during the period of the war. While these stories perhaps add overall context to the environment, they do not add to the discussion of the specifics of the Courland struggle.

What the author has presented well is the complexity of the societal aspects of the fighting. There was no question in anyone’s minds that the Germans were not going to prevail. Given that, the Latvians were looking to promises made by the Allied governments that they would be granted independence once Germany had surrendered; they therefore wished to facilitate this by preventing a reoccupation by the Soviets by assisting the Germans in resistance. They were therefore caught on the horns of a dilemma as they desperately tried to find a way out of the vice of the German and Soviet Armies. Hunt does a commendable job explaining and analyzing the motivations and hopes of the different protagonists. As he notes however, he was not able to get a perspective from the Russian side as no veterans from the conflict could be found.

An interesting and thoughtful book that would be further enhanced by being read in conjunction with a more detailed account of the Courland Pocket military campaign. The text serves as an excellent multifaceted analysis of the modern and historical impacts of the fighting. It is worth a read.